We study the e¤ect of UI bene…ts in a typical developing country where the informal sector is sizeable and persistent. In a partial equilibrium environment, ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI bene…ts, we characterize the stationary equilibrium of an economy where policyholders may be employed in the formal sector, short-run unemployed receiving UI bene…ts or long-run unemployed without UI bene…ts. We perform comparative static exercises to understand how UI bene…ts a¤ect unemployed workers'e¤ort to secure a formal job and their labor supply in the informal sector. Our model reveals that an increase in UI bene…ts generates two opposing e¤ects for the short-run unemployed. First, since search e¤orts cannot be monitored it generates moral hazard behaviours that lower e¤ort. Second, it generates an income e¤ect as it reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job and increases e¤ort. Even though in general it is ambiguous which e¤ect dominates, we show that for short durations UI bene…ts increase unemployed worker's e¤ort to secure a formal-sector job and decreases informal-sector work.
Introduction
Several developing countries have either adopted some protection against unemployment risk or are considering the introduction of unemployment insurance (UI) bene…ts (for example Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, México, and Uruguay). Few studies have analyzed the consequences of UI bene…ts on labor markets with a substantial informal sector. Developing countries'dual labor markets may reduce the desirability of a UI program because of a moral hazard problem: the unemployed may work in the informal sector while receiving UI bene…ts (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1999 , Alvarez-Parra and Sanchez, 2009 and Mazza, 2000 . In this paper we want to highlight an important theoretical mechanism absent in the existing literature: UI bene…ts also generate an income e¤ect that may allow the unemployed to devote less time in remunerated informal activities and consequently devote more time to secure a job in the formal sector.
In order to focus on the moral hazard problem, one of the most pressing issues for a developing country considering the introduction of UI bene…ts, we adapt a duration model à la Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) in a partial equilibrium environment i.e., ruling out the macroeconomic consequences of UI bene…ts. This feature allows us to derive analytical results. In our model the informal sector is sizeable, persistent and the bulk of it cannot be explained by UI bene…ts. At the stationary equilibrium we show that UI bene…ts generate an income e¤ect which reduces the marginal cost of searching for a formal job. This income e¤ect increases unemployed workers'e¤orts at the expense of their labor supply in the informal sector and therefore softens the moral hazard issue that arises from the unobservability of e¤ort. 1 Even though in general it is ambiguous which e¤ect dominates, we show that for short durations UI bene…ts increase unemployed worker's e¤ort to secure a formal-sector job and decreases informal-sector work. We also show that an increase in UI bene…ts received by short-run unemployed workers unambiguously increases the e¤orts of long-run unemployed workers to …nd a formal job.
The Model
We construct a continuous time model in order to analyze the e¤ects of increasing UI in an economy characterized by a signi…cantly sized informal sector. Workers can be either employed in the formal sector or unemployed. When they are employed in the formal sector they receive an hourly wage equal to w f . Formal-sector jobs are destroyed at a rate , and workers become unemployed. 2 Unemployed agents can either be short or long-run unemployed. When workers lose a formal-sector job they become short-run unemployed (denoted by index j = I) and receive UI bene…ts. Following Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) , we assume that UI bene…ts may expire at a Poisson rate, , independent of the policyholders' actions. This implies that the expected duration of UI bene…ts equals 1= . When UI bene…ts expire agents become long-run unemployed, j = N , and do not receive UI bene…ts anymore. Instead, they receive a transfer referred to as subsidy. Formal-sector opportunities arrive at rate p I for the short-run unemployed and p N for the long-run unemployed.
When employed in the formal sector we assume that workers split their total time, T , between formal-sector work, h, and leisure, L = T h. Since we want to focus on the consequences of increasing UI bene…ts on the decisions of unemployed workers, we suppose that the number of hours worked in the formal sector are exogenous. In contrast, when unemployed, either short or long-run, agents split their total time, T , into three activities. First, they can devote s j units of time to secure a formal-sector job, called e¤ort hereafter. Second, they can work a j units of time in the informal sector to earn an income. Finally, they can enjoy l j units of leisure time. The time constraint is
The total time that an unemployed worker devotes to the informal sector is then given by T s j l j . Crucially, we assume that s j and a j cannot be observed, that is, they are private information of the unemployed workers and consequently are not contractible. Moreover, e¤ort a¤ects the rate at which workers …nd a formal job, p j (s j ), with p 0 (:) > 0 and p 00 (:) < 0. Finally, when working in the informal sector, which is assumed to be frictionless and without rationing, workers receive an hourly wage of w i = kw f , where 0 k < 1. We assume that there exists a positive di¤erential of wages between the formal and informal sectors.
Workers
Agents are risk-averse and their preferences are represented by an increasing and concave VNM utility function, u. Let V E be the value of formal-sector employment, V I the value of the short-run unemployed workers who enjoy UI bene…ts and V N the value of the long-run unemployed workers who no longer have access to UI but bene…t from a UI subsidy. The ‡ow value of a formal-sector job is
where r denotes the subjective rate of time preference. The ‡ow value of a formal job depends on the income obtained and the leisure time enjoyed. A formal worker loses his job with probability and in this case becomes a short-run unemployed facing a capital loss of V E V I . The short-run unemployed receive UI bene…ts of b I w f h, where b I denotes the replacement ratio. While receiving UI bene…ts she can work in the informal sector a I units of time, where she earns an income of kw f a I . She can also exert e¤ort (s I ) to secure a formal job with probability p I (s I ), thus realizing a capital gain of V E V I . With probability , the short-run unemployed becomes a long-run unemployed, loses the UI bene…ts, and thus faces a capital loss of V I V N . The value function of a short-run unemployed is
Similarly, the ‡ow value of being long-run unemployed, without access to UI bene…ts, is
Long-run unemployed workers earn kw f a N from their labor supply in the informal sector and also bene…t from a government transfer, b N w f h. We naturally assume that
Considering the government's instrument b I ; b N as given, the unemployed workers in state j choose s j ; l j ; a j , such that s j ; l j ; a j 2 arg max V j . The …rst order conditions of this maximization program yield
and
Equation (4) shows that an unemployed worker undertakes e¤ort to secure a new job in the formal sector such that the marginal bene…t of this e¤ort, composed by the marginal increase of the probability of …nding a job times the di¤erence of values between being employed (j = E) and unemployed (j = I; N ), is equal to the marginal cost due to the reduction of leisure. Equation (5) shows that an unemployed worker chooses his level of informal labor supply to equalize his marginal consumption utility to his leisure marginal (opportunity) cost.
Comparative Statics at the Stationary Equilibrium
Similarly to Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) , we combine (1), (2) and (3) and obtain at the stationary equilibrium:
where
In what follows, we substitute the term V E V j we get at the stationary equilibrium into the …rst order conditions of the short and long-run unemployed workers. We then perform several comparative statics exercises. First, let us analyze the e¤ects generated by increasing UI bene…ts (respectively UI subsidies) on decisions taken by short-run (resp. long-run) unemployed workers.
Proposition 1 For short-run (long-run) unemployed workers an increase in b I (resp. in b N ) has ambiguous e¤ ects on informal-sector work, a I (resp. a N ), and time devoted to searching for a formal-sector job, s I (resp. s N ).
Proof. Appendix. Let us interpret the results for short-run unemployed workers, the intuition being the same for the results of the long-run unemployed. At the stationary equilibrium the …rst order conditions of the unemployed workers contain a wealth e¤ect, which mainly occurs at an intratemporal level, and a moral hazard e¤ect, which captures the e¤ects of the next period policy variables on the unemployed workers'decisions.
The condition that determines the e¤ect of UI bene…ts on short-run unemployed workers'e¤ort s I is given by
where H I and H I aa are positive and negative respectively due to the second order conditions (see appendix for more details). The …rst term (kw f u I ll u I cc u I cl 2 > 0)
captures the wealth e¤ect generated by the UI bene…ts: Thanks to UI bene…ts, all else being equal, short-run unemployed workers need to spend less time working in the informal sector and can devote more time to securing a formal-sector job. The second term is due to the presence of moral hazard: An increase in UI bene…ts in the future reduces V E V I , thus weakening incentives to secure a job in the formal sector. The existence of these two countervailing e¤ects generates the ambiguous results for the search e¤ort summarized in Proposition 1. The e¤ect of UI bene…ts on the informal-sector labor supply is given by
Interestingly, all else being equal, the same income e¤ect that increases the short-run unemployed workers' e¤ort also decreases the time devoted to informal activities (because of the negative sign preceding it). Moreover, the e¤ect generated by moral hazard on the time devoted to informal-sector work can be divided into two components. The …rst is given by the second term and captures a moral hazard e¤ect which increases short-run unemployed informal-sector work at the expense of e¤ort. The second moral hazard e¤ect is captured by the third term in the equation and captures the trade-o¤ between informal-sector work and leisure time. If leisure and consumption are complementary goods, that is, u cl 0, the income e¤ect and the second moral hazard e¤ect decrease the labor supply in the informal sector. The …rst moral hazard component is a countervailing e¤ect as it increases informal-sector work. Therefore, the sign of da I =db I depends on the relative sizes of these e¤ects.
Corollary 1 For short durations of UI bene…ts, 1= ! 0, b I unambiguously increases s I and decreases a I .
Proof. Straightforward from (6) and (7) as A ! 1 and kw f u I cc u I lc has an upper bound.
When UI bene…ts have a very short duration (like severance payments), the income e¤ect dominates the moral hazard e¤ect and increases in UI bene…ts decrease the size of the informal sector.
Let us now turn to the e¤ect of UI bene…ts on long-run unemployed workers.
Proposition 2 An increase in b I unambiguously increases s N ; if u N cl 0 it decreases a N (and increases l N ).
Proof. See Appendix. Interestingly, Proposition 2 reveals that UI bene…ts, b I , generates a moral hazard e¤ect only for the short-run unemployed. 3 An increase in UI bene…ts may decrease the unemployed workers' e¤ort to secure a formal job while short-run unemployed. However, the existence of UI bene…ts received by the short-run unemployed unambiguously increases the e¤ort undertaken by long-run unemployed workers to secure a formal job, s N . This entitlement e¤ect emerges at the stationary equilibrium because V E V N increases with u I u N , which in turn increases with b I . Everything else equal, the increase of UI bene…ts for short-run unemployed increases the present value V E , and consequently increases the e¤ort undertaken by long-run unemployed to secure a job in the formal sector. The e¤ects of UI bene…ts on informal-sector work and leisure time of the long-run unemployed depend on the cross derivative between consumption and leisure.
Finally, the expiration rate of UI bene…ts, , has a very close relationship with a key feature of UI design. The e¤ects of changes in on the time allocation decisions of short and long-run unemployed workers are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 An increase in : i) increases s I ; if u I cl > 0 it decreases a I (and increases l I ). ii) decreases s N ; if u I cl > 0 it increases a N (and l N ).
Proof. See online appendix.
An increase in the expiration rate of UI bene…ts (or a decrease in the duration of UI bene…ts) reduces the moral hazard e¤ect for the short-run unemployed since, ceteris paribus, they have greater incentives to secure a job in the formal sector. In this case, the trade-o¤ between labor supply in the informal sector and leisure time is standard. For the same reason that b I increases the long run unemployed's e¤ort, an increase of the duration of UI makes V E more attractive, and consequently gives stronger incentives to the long-run unemployed to secure a formal job. Since V E V N decreases with , all else equal, an increase in decreases the marginal bene…t of e¤ort. Finally, when u N cl > 0 an increase in increases the labor supply in the informal sector and leisure of long-run unemployed workers, at the expense of time devoted to securing a formal-sector job.
Discussion
In this note, the partial equilibrium set up allows us to derive analytical results on the consequences of increasing UI bene…ts. Our results reveal that in developing countries with dual labor markets UI bene…ts generate an income e¤ect, countervailing to the traditional moral hazard e¤ect. Because UI bene…ts increase unemployed workers'incomes they need to devote less time to informal jobs and, ceteris paribus, they spend more time securing a new job in the formal sector. Analytically, in general it is ambiguous whether the moral hazard or income e¤ects dominates. Nevertheless, our results reveal that for very short durations of UI bene…ts, increases in UI bene…ts unambiguously increase the e¤ort undertaken and reduce the labor supply in the informal sector.
Our results suggest that developing countries should not be discouraged from adopting UI bene…ts by the mere existence of the moral hazard e¤ect. However, to be able to characterize the optimal design of UI bene…ts in developing countries we strongly believe that this analysis must be extended in several ways. This issue should be resumed in a general equilibrium framework that would contain a matching process a la Pissarides (2000) in order to take into account the e¤ect of UI coverage on the wage bargained in the formal sector. 4 As it is likely that the design of optimal UI coverage depends on labor market features, this general equilibrium approach should be combined with a calibration strategy using data from speci…c dual labor markets in developing countries. It is in our research agenda.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Applying Cramer's rule yields: 
